Francesco Bergoglio Errico, Freelance Researcher, Founder and Director of the Monitoring Jihadism Project (MjP).

The interview with Francesco Bergoglio Errico, independent researcher and founder of the Monitoring Jihadism Project, provides in-depth insight into the evolution of jihadism in Italy and the measures put in place to combat it. Based on original work involving the analysis of hundreds of court files, he discusses the profiles of the individuals involved, how the phenomenon has changed since the 1990s, and the specific features of the Italian counterterrorism system. The discussion also addresses the issues of prevention, counter-terrorism in prison, and the importance of access to judicial sources in order to improve research on terrorism.

Can you tell us about your background and what led you to take an interest in terrorism?

In terms of my academic background, I graduated with degrees in both Geography and Anthropology. I then went on to complete a higher-level Master's degree in Geopolitics and Security. During my postgraduate specialisation in 2017, I studied radicalisation, focusing particularly on jihadism. I have continued to study these issues in depth since then.

For some years, I also had the opportunity to interview many prisoners, including Muslims, at one of Italy’s largest prisons in Rome. There, I explored the dynamics of radicalisation in prison. At the same time, I began teaching the prison police on behalf of the Ministry of Justice, eventually teaching the anti-terrorism unit. I currently teach postgraduate courses on terrorism at the Universities of Bari and Bergamo.

However, it was the opportunity to study judicial documents and talk to those who personally followed the investigations that took my research on jihadist terrorism to the next level.

Over the years, I have collected thousands of pages of judicial documents relating to investigations into jihadist terrorism or related crimes since 1993. In essence, this is the history - the anatomy - of jihadism in Italy.

Studying these documents in depth has distanced me from academic theory, but brought me closer to the world of 'grey literature' which few people have had the opportunity to engage with. This type of material is particularly useful if you want to understand the jihadist phenomenon 'from the inside'.

Reading wiretapped conversations, social media posts and emails allows a researcher to gain knowledge that differs from academic knowledge. Furthermore, although all the material was related to Italian investigations, I eventually realised that the Italian situation is not dissimilar to others, since we are always talking about jihadists. 

For example, the investigations conducted in Italy in the 1990s revealed activities that were remarkably similar to those in the UK, France and other Western countries. Furthermore, everyone involved was somehow connected to Egypt, Algeria, Afghanistan or Pakistan.

In short, my passion for studying jihadist terrorism emerged suddenly and remains my greatest passion to this day.

Can you explain the history and anatomy of Italian jihadism? What are its specific characteristics, in a national context marked by the terrorism of the “Years of Lead”?

"Anatomy of Jihadism in Italy" is the title of a research project that took me five years to complete. As I said, gathering judicial material on over 500 people is complex and time-consuming, and studying the material is another step entirely. Writing a book is yet another step. Moreover, doing it out of passion is extremely challenging. The book "Anatomy of Jihadism in Italy" is the result of intensive research that is currently unique in its field. To put it nicely, no one before me has been crazy enough to try to collect all that material!

In terms of the research’s findings, my research outlines the key characteristics of individuals investigated and/or prosecuted for jihadist terrorism in Italy since 1993. In short, the cases show that the majority are men with an average age of 29. Almost all of them are foreigners with little cultural or religious education – though there are some exceptions. Women are a minority and only appear in investigations after 2009, but they had a significant impact. Converts and native Italians are also a minority. Other notable characteristics include the fact that a large proportion were trained, either militarily or through self-training, and that several individuals were involved in planning terrorist attacks.

Another interesting aspect is the difference between investigations conducted before and after 2009. Reading the court documents provides a better understanding of what the literature has told us. This is about the differences between al-Qaeda and Islamic State. It is also about the differences between old-style jihadism and that of recent years. Old-style jihadism was based on a widespread network. Recent years’ investigations are carried out entirely by monitoring the web and the social media accounts of those under investigation. Previously, however, undercover agents and the monitoring of mosques and call centres were predominantly used.

Finally, the Years of Lead were one of the darkest periods in Italy’s history. This era had a profound influence on the development of the police force and the judiciary, and the very same investigative techniques have since been employed in the ongoing battle against the Mafia and jihadist terrorism. It is no coincidence that anti-Mafia prosecutors have also become anti-terrorism prosecutors. In short, the methods and techniques used in the fight against the Mafia and terrorism in the Years of Lead have been adapted for use in today’s anti-terrorism efforts.

What are the policies for combating terrorism and how does the anti-terrorism justice system work in Italy?

The Italian anti-terrorism judicial system is based on the offence of participating in a terrorist association, as set out in Article 270 bis of the Criminal Code, which was only introduced after 11 September 2001. Previously, jihadist terrorism was combated through the criminal offence of criminal association, as set out in Article 416 of the Criminal Code.

Since the introduction of Article 270 bis, further criminal offences have emerged, including training and self-training, recruitment and self-recruitment, and organising travel to war zones. Administrative measures have also been introduced, including special surveillance and the seizure of passports. In addition, a significant administrative measure that has been in effect for a considerable period is the expulsion and repatriation from the national territory of individuals deemed a threat to national security. This is typically executed through the signature of the Minister of the Interior or a Prefect.

The last point needs to be explored in closer detail. Administrative expulsions are one of the most widely used and important tools for combating terrorism, both now and historically. In cases where there is insufficient evidence to prosecute someone, administrative expulsion is often used for reasons of national security. Such expulsion can be based on intelligence reports that cannot be used in a court of law due to their confidential nature.

However, expulsion can also be judicial. This means it is decided by judges. Judicial expulsion is then enforced after the defendant has served their sentence. Consequently, non-Italian citizens convicted of terrorism face repatriation to their country of origin. For citizens with dual nationality, it is possible to revoke Italian citizenship if they are convicted of terrorism, after which they can be expelled.

Another very important instrument for combating terrorism and extremism is the CASA (Comitato di Analisi Strategica Antiterrorismo - Strategic Counterterrorism Analysis Committee), which was created after the terrorist attacks at the Italian military base in Nassiriya, Iraq (November 2003). CASA is a kind of fusion centre where all heads of counter-terrorism forces and Intelligence agencies share information and take decisions, such as deportations. CASA plays a central role in the counter-terrorism apparatus, and many countries have been inspired by this mechanism.

Finally, I would like to make a comment about criminal convictions in Italy. The average prison sentence for participating in a terrorist organisation or committing crimes such as recruitment, training or financing is four to five years. Only a few were sentenced to more than 7 or 8 years. In my opinion, there are too many loopholes that defence lawyers can exploit, such as abbreviated trials (a kind of fast-track trial) which reduces the sentence by a third. These loopholes for terrorist offences should be eliminated so that all those charged with terrorist offences can be sentenced to longer prison terms than the current average.

I would also like to point out that individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences are placed in special prison sections and kept separate from ordinary prisoners. Whether this is a good or bad thing is open to debate, as there is no universally accepted way of managing terrorist prisoners. However, this type of prison regime enables effective constant monitoring of prisoners, encourages them to participate in rehabilitation programmes, and prevents them from radicalising vulnerable individuals.

Are there any policies for preventing radicalization and reintegrating extremist militants?

Such policies and programmes certainly exist; however, the available information is not public. Additionally, I note that specific measures are in place to facilitate the reintegration of minors convicted of terrorist offences. While there are not many of these minors, several stakeholders, including the juvenile judiciary, law enforcement agencies, psychologists, psychiatrists and educators, pay particular attention to them.

Regarding the prevention of radicalisation, there is no law that specifically addresses this issue. A draft law was prepared some years ago but unfortunately it was never approved. Consequently, the prevention of radicalisation is also carried out by law enforcement agencies, even though they are not technically responsible for it.

Finally, drawing on my experience of the prison system, I would like to make a further comment. The prevention of radicalisation and monitoring of radicalised inmates - not only those convicted of terrorism, but also those convicted of ordinary crimes - is the responsibility of officers in the Central Investigative Unit of the Penitentiary Police (NIC). Proximity to the inmates is key to prevention and monitoring. They can quickly discover whether an inmate has lied about his religion or is pretending not to be a practising Muslim. Those who are radicalised are constantly monitored, while surveillance is used for those who are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. In such cases, highly charismatic inmates who are trying to recruit others can be moved to different sections, or vulnerable inmates can be transferred to interrupt any recruitment process. In short, the NIC - which participates in CASA - is a fundamental part of the counter-terrorism system.

Furthermore, it is of vital importance that the Penitentiary Police communicate with other law enforcement agencies regarding radicalised inmates who are released from prison. While this may seem like a trivial detail, it is crucial to ensure that monitoring is transferred from the Penitentiary Police to the State Police or the Carabinieri, and that the former inmate does not disappear from monitoring.

What are the specific characteristics and drivers of terrorist involvement in Italy, particularly jihadism?

As of today, one of the most important drivers is the use of the web and social media regarding both jihadism and right-wing extremism. In contrast, physical connection remains central to left-wing extremism and anarchism.

With particular reference to jihadism, many Italian investigations in recent years have stemmed from online monitoring carried out by Italian police forces, or at the prompting of Intelligence agencies, sometimes in collaboration with foreign agencies such as the FBI.

Another significant factor is the lack of religious and cultural education, particularly among young people from Muslim families. These youths often come from challenging societies and cultures, which can lead to radicalisation and associated issues, such as participating in terrorist activities. This combination of factors is one of the most significant drivers.

For young people, as well as adults, men and women, geopolitical events can often provide the trigger needed to decide to take action. For example, the terrorist attack that occurred on 7 October perpetrated by Hamas terrorist organisation and the subsequent events have led to a growing number of people - some of whom were arrested and others expelled - taking action. Some of these individuals have increased the dissemination of jihadist propaganda, begun to express worrying opinions, started to radicalise others, sought contact with active militants in order to make themselves available for terrorist objectives some swore allegiance to the Caliph, etc. In short, geopolitical events can generate strong polarisation within society and provide a new impetus for action. This has emerged from investigations conducted in recent years.

How did the Monitoring Jihadism Project (MjP) come about? What are its objectives and what gaps is it attempting to fill?

The Monitoring Jihadism Project (MjP) began at the same time as I started writing my book, "Anatomy of Jihadism in Italy". I initially created the project with the aim of publishing the first database to contain information on over 500 individuals investigated for jihadism in Italy. This unique database serves as a useful tool for anyone interested in exploring the Italian case and jihadism more broadly. Thanks to my team of volunteers, I have also published more than 230 brief biographies of the individuals listed in the database, based primarily on judicial documents. As a result, at least one gap has already been filled, since nothing similar existed on the Italian case prior to this project. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all the prosecutors and counter-terrorism units who helped me with this initiative.

Over the past year, I have further developed the project to expand its scope beyond Italy to become an information hub on jihadism. Currently, my team and I are monitoring all news relating to investigations, arrests, convictions, acquittals and expulsions in various countries, such as France, India, Turkey and other European countries. The number of countries monitored is growing, with more to be added soon. The objective is to provide a clear, country-by-country overview with all available news on the aforementioned topics. On a single page, researchers, analysts and journalists can find all the relevant news on a particular country. The goal is to inform in the best possible way. However, although the project is growing exponentially with views from around the world, passion alone is no longer enough and there are obviously no funds. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the project is fulfilling its purpose.

What areas of work need to be developed in order to better understand terrorism and combat the phenomenon more effectively?

I am convinced that in order to understand and combat terrorism effectively, it is necessary to study it. An excellent way to deepen understanding would certainly be to make judicial documentation on terrorism cases available to researchers, since research based on primary sources is the most valuable.

Unfortunately, despite my attempts to request it in different countries, every country has its own rules for providing judicial materials, and in some places, privacy laws make it nearly impossible to study specific cases. In other countries, such as the United Kingdom, access to judicial records is prohibitively expensive.

With regard to privacy and thorough anonymisation, researchers are unable to gain deep insight into what is happening in reality. In some countries, it is not possible to know the names of terrorists. It is also not possible to know their stories. Sometimes, even reports of arrests are not published.

I believe that we all have the right to know the names of people arrested and prosecuted for terrorism. This right is currently being denied to us in the name of privacy. I can understand withholding information about minors, but not about adults.

In Italy, for example, the names of people arrested often do come out - though not always - and, although complex, it is possible to find information for research. In other countries, however, it is absolutely impossible to find detailed information or delve into little-known or unknown cases.

To be very clear, I will give just one example: what would Italian citizens say if the names of mafia members were never published? We have the right to know who the members of the mafia are, and we also have the right to know the names and stories of those who have chosen to embrace jihad. I hope that, in the near future, countries with strict privacy laws will at least allow researchers to access the valuable court documents that are essential for studying jihadism. This would certainly help to deepen our understanding of terrorism.