John Horgan, Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Georgia State University.

For more than thirty years, psychologist John Horgan has been one of the leading figures in the study of terrorism and violent extremism. Through his research, he has challenged simplistic explanations of radicalization and highlighted the diversity of pathways into and out of political violence. In this interview, he reflects on the definition of terrorism, the role of ideology and identity, the importance of speaking directly with terrorists, and the evolution of disengagement and deradicalization approaches. He also discusses the challenges posed by online extremism and offers a critical assessment of recent U.S. counterterrorism policies.

Could you tell us about your background and explain what led you to take an interest in terrorism and violent extremism?

I was born in Ireland and studied psychology at University College, Cork. One of my professors, Max Taylor, was (and still is) a well-known terrorism expert. He didn’t teach terrorism courses at the time, but his work made a huge impression on me, and I knew I wanted to explore how psychology could contribute to the study of terrorist behavior. I think most people assume that because I grew up in Ireland, that is the reason I developed an interest in terrorism, but it’s not the case. I was very much aware of the Troubles as a child, but I grew up in the south of Ireland, and even though Ireland is a very small country, Northern Ireland may as well have been a different planet. Most of my experience of the Troubles was watching the evening news and reading the paper about certain attacks or bombings. I didn’t develop a serious interest in any of it until after I got to university and started to explore how involvement in political violence can happen through some very ordinary processes and dynamics. The idea that someone can engage in extreme violence without necessarily suffering from mental illness or being ‘special’ in any way, made a profound impact on me. I wanted to learn more about how relatively ordinary people got involved in terrorism, and what their journeys into it looked like. It’s over thirty years since I started studying this phenomenon and I feel like I am still just scratching the surface of it.

How can we agree on a common definition of terrorism? Why does this remain such a difficult task? Do other notions or concepts seem more relevant to you when considering this phenomenon?

No, I don’t think so, but I also think we are wasting our time always talking about how we need to agree on a common definition. We will never explicitly agree on a commonly held definition because it serves the interests of political elites to use the word as they see fit. The problem isn’t a lack of definition, it’s that nobody wants to be consistent in how they use it. The word terrorism is a powerful label that can be used to label one’s political opponents. Here in the United States, we’ve seen how politicians attempt to delegitimize political protest by calling its participants ‘terrorists.’ It’s a pejorative label that is used inconsistently and hypocritically. It remains a difficult task to define terrorism because most people want to incorporate some judgements about the legitimacy of a particular struggle or agenda in that definition as opposed to defining it in terms of its behavior or function. Now it’s true that there are many definitions out there, but the truth is that most of those definitions are largely the same – the core features of these definitions is that terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence directed primarily by non-state actors against non-combatants, for the goal of advancing some social, political, religious, or other ideological agenda. I would say about 90% of all definitions capture these elements. The other 10% just differ in their emphasis. Some are broader in scope, while others are narrower, but those are the core features of what is meant by ‘terrorism.’ I like to remind people that terrorism is a strategy that can be used by a wide variety of actors, from non-state individuals, groups and movements, to state sponsors and governments. It’s a strategy that can be used by anyone, and also in the pursuit of a wide range of objectives, from single issues (like the environment, animal rights, or abortion) to ethno-nationalist aspirations of political independence, to even grander goals like the establishment of a global caliphate.

Who becomes a terrorist? Why is it important to distinguish the profiles, trajectories, and forms of engagement that we group under this term?

I used to say that anyone could become a terrorist. I don’t believe that anymore. I know of a lot of people who wanted to get involved in militancy only to discover that they didn’t like the experience. So, they decided to serve the cause in another (non-violent) way, like fundraising or disseminating propaganda. While technically anyone might be able to get involved, the life of a terrorist is not for everyone. But demographically, speaking, terrorism today is very diverse. In the past, it was mostly young, angry men aged 18-24 who got involved. Now, it’s men, women, and children of all ages, all backgrounds, and all experiences can become involved in terrorism in equally diverse ways. They can do this either as lone actors, or members of groups, organizations, or mass movements. They can also engage in terrorism under the guidance or sponsorship of state actors. Because of this diversity, the idea that we could have a single profile of who becomes a terrorist is naïve. If anything, ‘diversity’ is today’s profile. We no longer talk about profiles per se and instead focus on the pathways that people take into (and out of terrorism). It’s important to map these trajectories because if we can do that, we can figure out how to disrupt those same pathways and prevent terrorism from taking place.

Why and how does one become a terrorist? Conversely, how can we explain why so few individuals engage in extremism, whether violent or non-violent?

I still struggle to give a simple answer to this question. The answer is that it depends. You can examine the life histories of two people affiliated with the same movement or cause, yet they might have very different experiences of getting and remaining involved. We can also look at lone actors. These are people who may affiliate with a certain cause or movement, but don’t have any physical ties to it. Even among them, there is still a diversity of experiences associated with their actions. Why do they do it? Well there’s no shortage of theories out there to try and explain this. You will see theories that point to one reason or will say that people get involved because they want to feel “significant” or because involvement fulfils certain needs. All of that seems like common sense, and much of it is only just pop psychology that doesn’t reveal much. In short, people get involved in terrorism because of a combination of factors. It’s a mix of ideological influences, grievances, personal background factors, and the situations people find themselves in at the time they make certain decisions. We used to think susceptibility to involvement in terrorism was about some personal vulnerability or character predisposition people have but it’s more likely that it’s the environment (online or otherwise) people find themselves in that provides the real answers associated with how and why they choose to get involved. The bigger question isn’t why people get into terrorism, it’s why so few do it. We don’t have good answers to that question, in part, because it remains challenging to interview terrorists with the rigor we would need to provide scientifically valid answers. Also, funding for research on terrorism has almost disappeared here in the United States since Donald Trump’s second administration took power. Again, I used to ask the question of why someone becomes involved in terrorism, but the real question is why so few do it. And without enough research on this, we just don’t know.

What motivates individuals who aspire to violent engagement? What role do ideology, belief, and psychological dynamics play in these trajectories?

So not everyone who gets involved in terrorism wants to commit an act of violence. There are lots of ways people can express their commitment, through different types of roles. Some involve violence, while many don’t. For the person who wants to commit an act of violence against an enemy, they are motivated by a combination of ideological and personal issues. The precise combination will vary from person to person, and will vary in the same person over time, because their own understanding or insights into their behavior may change. They are driven by a burning, moral outrage against what they see as a grave injustice. They identify or affiliate with the target of that injustice, whether it’s their own community or some people or a cause they identify with from afar. They come to believe (either on their own, or with help) that violence is the only response the enemy will understand, and they believe that the use of terrorism will fundamentally make the world a better place at least for them or the people they claim to represent. Those are some of the broad themes shared by people who get involved in committing violent acts on behalf of these ideologies. Ideology is an important defining feature of terrorism, but it’s not the only factor feeding someone’s motivation. It’s just one of several influences that shapes, and gives meaning and legitimacy to someone’s acts.

Why is it necessary - even urgent - to speak with terrorists? What methodologies do you consider most relevant for studying these actors? Does the so-called “mindhunter” approach strike you as heuristic, or does it have certain limitations?

Well the simple answer here is that because so relatively few people get involved in terrorism, we have to pay attention to what they say, and how they say it. We can study their writings, their ideologies, their manifestos. We can examine their behavior, retracing their steps before, during and after a violent event. But we still have to sit down with them and ask questions about how and why they did what they did. We need that first-person perspective to form a complete picture for us. We cannot understand people who get involved in terrorism unless we speak to them. It’s as simple as that. Speaking to them doesn’t mean we have to sympathize with them, but they are still normal human beings who have made decisions about what they did. If we meet them, speak with them, and most importantly, listen to what they have to say, we can begin to better understand them, as well as what we need to do to stop future acts of terrorism from taking place.

In what ways does jihadism exhibit specific characteristics among the various forms of contemporary terrorism?

Like I say, terrorism is a very diverse activity, not just because of the different kinds of people it attracts, but because different ideological strands (jihadist, left-wing, right-wing, etc.) can take root in particular places or contexts that provide opportunities for people to identify with a cause and get involved in it. It’s important to remember that jihadism isn’t a monolith. There are different types, different expressions, and what jihadism means to a young, disaffected immigrant in a Parisian suburb is going to be very different to what it means to a different young person living on the coast of Somalia recruited by local groups there. We can compare different jihadist ideologies to understand whether there is something about the ideology that compels people to get involved, but ideology is only one part of the puzzle. Understanding the decisions that individuals make, and the context in which they make those decisions, are the most important steps here. It’s easy to get swept up in the content of an ideology, but what matters more is the meaning that an ideology has for that person at a particular moment in their lives. But overall, emotions, social connections, a sense of purpose and identity, matter more than just a focus on ideology. It’s the combination of all these factors that constitute the risk of terrorism. One of the most interesting features associated with jihadist ideologies is the urgency they place on doing something (as opposed to just talking) and placing responsibility on individual actors to act before it’s too late, and the forces of evil have completed their work. I explore jihadism in terms of how as an ideology, it shapes a person’s involvement, shapes their mindset, and helps them make sense of their actions. Other researchers might explore jihadist ideologies in the context of whether being a jihadist (as opposed to a different type of terrorist) might be associated more with certain types of violent tactics, or greater lethality. Different researchers will focus on different parts of the same phenomena as we try to grabble with understanding it.

How do you perceive the evolution of paradigms regarding disengagement from and deradicalization of violent extremism? Which models or approaches do you find most convincing today?

I was one of the first researchers to call attention to these processes, and I am very happy to see just how much excellent research has appeared in this space. There is even a dedicated peer-reviewed scientific journal that solely focuses on disengagement and deradicalization. I think there is still much work to be done, especially in just educating practitioners and policy makers about the benefits of exploring disengagement and deradicalization. Many in the West still see these as ‘soft’ options. I like to tell policymakers that they are ‘smart’ options. There remains an urgent need to evaluate disengagement programs because not all programs are created equal, and some run the risk of causing more harm than good. Most of these programs are still surrounded in secrecy, but there is an urgent need for practitioners who run these initiatives to collaborate with researchers to help these programs work better, more effectively, and ultimately to help ensure those programs have a future.

What avenues of inquiry do you believe would lead to a better understanding of terrorism and the processes of radicalization? Should new methodological or epistemological approaches emerge?

Terrorism has changed immeasurably in the past 10 years. We’ve seen the re-emergence of state actors in a major way, and the Internet has provided so many new opportunities not just for different types of terrorism to emerge, but also for so many different types of people to get involved. We’re seeing more young people get involved now, and the proliferation of diverse social media platforms are turbocharging these opportunities. There is an urgent need to better understand how decentralized online communities lure young people in to new types of terrorism like nihilistic violent extremism. I don’t believe that most models of radicalization are well-equipped to help us understand any of this. We need so much more collaboration between counterterrorism practitioners, mental health practitioners, and researchers here. We also need far more attention paid to the accounts, stories, and interviews that make up the first-hand experiences of those who were involved in terrorism.

What is your view of the most recent U.S. strategies regarding counterterrorism and the prevention of violent extremism?

A few weeks ago, the United States released its new Counterterrorism Strategy. In my view, it fails to acknowledge new and emerging threats and is more focused on making political statements than providing any kind of real strategy to address current or future terrorism. I am also concerned that the United States has essentially abolished its community-led prevention efforts through cuts in federal funding. This, along with cutting research grants to researchers, represents a generational step backwards for understanding and preventing terrorism. I think the United States is falling behind when it comes to counterterrorism, and its reliance on kinetic counter-terrorism responses as a strategy for preventing future terrorism is just fundamentally wrong. Over the past ten years, we’ve seen successive governments embrace practitioner-academic-clinician partnerships, and we’ve seen promising developments associated with using public health-style approaches to prevention. At the federal level, all of that has ended abruptly under the Trump administration. It falls to individual states now to build the partnerships required for effective collaboration when it comes to prevention.